By Dr. Abbas Bakhtiar
It is said that there is more than
one way to skin a cat. It seems that United States is trying to skin this cat
–Iran- in anyway that it can,
including economic strangulation. While people are concerned with
Iraq and the gathering armada
in the Persian Gulf, United
States has been quietly carrying out a not so covert
economic war against Iran.
Since the 1979 revolution in
Iran, the country has been
under constant US unilateral sanctions. “The first
U.S. sanctions against
Iran were formalized in November of
1979, and during the hostage crisis, many sanctions were leveled against the
Iranian government. By 1987 the import of Iranian goods into the
United
States had been banned. In 1995, President
Clinton issued Executive Order 12957, banning U.S. investment in Iran's energy
sector, followed a few weeks later by Executive Order 12959 of May 6, 2000,
eliminating all trade and investment and virtually all interaction between the
United States and Iran.” [[1]]
Despite the sanctions
Iran continued to attract foreign
investment and technical cooperation for its energy sector. Countries such as
France, Italy and others took advantage of
absence of the American competition and tried to fill the gap. However, the
threat of American retaliation kept the investment way bellow the desired
levels. It only allowed Iran to continue to keep its oil
export at its OPEC determined quota level.
The Economic Chokepoint: Oil &
Gas
“According to the Oil and Gas
Journal, as of January 1, 2006, Iran held 132.5 billion barrels of
proven oil reserves. This figure, which includes recent discoveries in the Kushk
and Hosseineih fields of Khuzestan province, means Iran holds
roughly 10 percent of the world's total proven reserves. The vast majority of
Iran's crude oil reserves are located
in giant onshore fields in the south-western Khuzestan region near the Iraqi
border. Overall, Iran has 40 producing fields – 27
onshore and 13 offshore. Iran's crude oil is generally medium
in sulfur and in the 28°-35° API range.”[[2]]
There is no doubt that Iranian
economy is driven by oil. Oil revenues constitute over 70 percent of its total
export earnings and 50 percent of its GDP. Iran’s oil revenues were $32 billion in 2004,
$45.6 billion in 2005, and
according to Iran's National Oil Company
international affairs director, Hojjatollah Ghanimifard, will reach $52 billion by the end of the Iranian
calendar year (21 March 2007).
Iran currently produces about
4 million barrels of oil per day, of which only 2.5 million barrels are exported
with the remaining 1.5 million barrel being consumed internally. According to
the latest report (26 Dec 2007) by the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States (NAS), if the current increase in local Iranian oil consumption
continues and the current decline in oil production is not stopped, then by 2015
Iran’s oil export will decline to zero.[[3]]
According to this and other reports Iran needs to invest about $2.5 billion a
year just to stand still. Iran is not running out of oil, but
needs money to maintain old fields and bring in the new fields
online.
The existing major oil fields in
Iran are: Ahwaz (1958), Aghajari (1936), Gacchsaran (1937) and Marun
(1963). These four fields together, during their highest output, produced almost
4.5 million barrel of oil per day. All four reached their peak in late 60s to
mid 70s. According to Mathew
R. Simmons by 2003, these 4 oilfields’ combined
production were reduced to 1.7 million barrel per day. [[4]]
The current US strategy is to starve the Iranian oil and gas
industries of new investments, thereby reducing the Iranian government’s
revenues which are hoped will in turn reduce Iran’s ability
to maintain not only its armed forces, but also the government’s social
obligations to its people (subsidies, salaries, etc.). It is hoped that this
combined with international isolation and (with the help of Saudi Arabia) a
reduction in oil prices (OPEC crude basket price: $51.25 per barrel on 8/1/07)
will not only cripple the Iranian economy, but also (possibly) lead to a regime
change. All attacks on the economy was being presented under the guise of
stopping Iran from developing WMDs, and in
particular Nuclear weapons.
The attack on Iranian economy
started in earnest in early 2006. United
States began putting considerable pressure on international
banks and financial institutions to cut their ties with Iran. Countries
also were pressured to reduce their economic contact with Iran. For
example beside the usual behind the scene warnings and threats, in September
2006, the US treasury secretary M. Paulson Jr, used his first meeting of world
finance chiefs as a venue for the Bush administration's mission to isolate
Iran.
“Emerging from a meeting of finance
ministers representing the Group of Seven industrialized nations, Paulson said
he urged his counterparts to intensify efforts to prevent banks and private
companies in their countries from being used as unwitting conduits for financing
and materials aiding Iran's ambitions.”[[5]]
Later under pressure from the
US some three top Japanese
banks: Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi
UFJ, Mizuho Corporate Bank and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp announced that, in
line with US financial sanctions, they will refrain from working with
Iran's state-run Bank Saderat
of Iran (with 3400 branches in Iran). Recently another major Iranian
Bank with some foreign branches is
being targeted for freeze of assets and sanctions. “Bank Sepah International Plc
(BSIP), incorporated in the United
Kingdom, specializes in providing finance and services for
international trade worldwide with a particular focus on Iran and the Persian
Gulf region, according to its Web site. The bank is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Bank Sepah, Iran, which was established in 1925
and is the oldest of the Iranian banks. Bank Sepah has a large network of
branches in Iran as well as
offices in Paris, Frankfurt and Rome”.[[6]]
The pressure was also felt by Indian
and Swiss banks as well. In mid 2006 the State Bank of India (SBI), the only
Indian bank operating in Iran (with a token presence) came under intense
pressure to quit Iran [[7]].
Other banks that succumbed to the
pressure were USB AG (took over Banco Pactual S.A. in 2006) and Credit Suisse
Group of Switzerland
(controlling group of other banks such as: Bank Leu, Schweizerische Volksbank,
Neue Aargauer Bank, Winterthur, and Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette Inc.). UBS AG, Europe's largest bank by assets, also cut all business
ties with Iran in January
2006 and met with U.S. legislators in April 2006 about its transfers of U.S.
banknotes to the Islamic Republic. Credit Suisse Group, Switzerland's second-biggest bank, also quit
Iran in January. Other Banks to quit
or restrict their activities in Iran were: ABN AMRO of Holland and London-based
HSBC.
These were just a few example of
United States’ indirect
financial pressure on Iran. Governments, companies and
financial institutions are under intense pressure to terminate all dealings with
Iran. But so far Iran has managed
to sustain, albeit with great difficulty, its oil industry and financial
institutions functioning.
Iran’s
Strategy
Iran facing the American
financial attack on its oil facilities has been quick to seek other venues for
both investment in its oil facilities and financial transactions. Iran facing a increasingly hostile US and
Europeans has turned to Russia and China for
investment and technical know-how for its oil and gas industries.
China has the needed financial muscle
and enough thirst for energy to disregard American pressures.
China is already investing heavily in
Iranian oil fields, securing for itself a portion of the oil and gas reserves.
China with 1.3 billion people and
fast growing economy is already the second largest oil consumer in the world. If
China’s economic growth
continues, it is estimated that by 2020 China’s energy needs will increase by
150 percent.
“China's expectation of growing future dependence
on oil imports has brought it to acquire interests in exploration and production
in places like Kazakhstan,
Russia, Venezuela, Sudan, West
Africa, Iran,
Saudi Arabia and
Canada. But despite its efforts to
diversify its sources, China
has become increasingly dependent on Middle
East oil. Today, 58% of China's oil imports come from the
region. By 2015, the share of Middle East oil
will stand on 70%. Though historically China has had no long-standing strategic
interests in the Middle East, its relationship
with the region from where most of its oil comes is becoming increasingly
important.”[[8]]
Last year China signed oil and gas contracts worth over
$100 billion with Iran. China is heavily
involved in developing the huge Yadavaran oil field. “If completed, the deal
will allow China to buy 150,000 barrels of
Iranian crude a day at market rates for 25 years as well as 250 million tons of
liquefied natural gas. Under an initial agreement signed by the Sinopec Group in
October 2004, China could pay
Iran as much as $100 billion for the
stake and the purchases of oil and gas over 25 years.” [[9]]
Interestingly Royal Dutch Shell Plc works as technical consultant for Sinopec on
Yadavaran field.
On 25 December 2006, National
Offshore Oil Corp of China
announced the signing of a $16 billion memorendom of understanding to
develop Iran’s North Pars gas
field and build liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants in Iran. The
project is expected to take 8 years to complete.
Russia is also interested to
enter the lucrative Iranian oil and gas market. According to Moscow Times, the
Russian oil company LUKoil is about to sign a contract for producing oil from
Iran’s Azadegan field [[10]].
There are also Russian companies vying for entry into the Iranian market.
“Mashna Uqua Company has offered National Iranian South Oil Company (NISOC) to
apply the new technology to improve ROR at one of Iranian oil reserves, the
source who wanted not to be identified told the Mehr News Agency. The technology
includes the injection of a gel into oil reserve, which prevents rush of water
into the reserve and thereby improving the ROR, the source elaborated.”[[11]]
Russia is also very interested
to create a gas cartel, similar to OPEC. Recently a senior Russian parliamentarian called
for creation of a producers’ cartel to “stand-up” to the consumers’ cartel.
"It is necessary to form a gas
alliance, which could be joined by Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus," the
head of the Russian parliament's energy committee Valery Yazev said Monday,
RIA-Novosti reported. "Tomorrow, with the removal of the problem of
Iran's nuclear program, I
would also see Iran in this alliance," Mr Yazev
said, speaking at a meeting of the Russian Gas Union industry group, which he
also heads.[[12]]
It is no secret that
Russia is using its energy resources
to gain maximum commercial and political advantage in its dealing with the EU
and others. Gazprom is already a mighty oil giant and is moving fast to become
the world’s leading supplier of Gas as well. Russia is trying
to monopolise the gas market. The only potential competitor to Gazprom would be
Iran. If Russia manages to create a gas cartel with
Iran, Europe will become a captive market with few options for
its gas supplies.
Local Energy
Consumption
As was mentioned above, of the 4
million barrel per day oil production about 1.5 million barrel is consumed
locally in Iran. Iran has a
burgeoning car industry with majority of the cars produced for local market.
There are over 3 million cars in Tehran alone; with nearly half of them being
dilapidated old gas guzzlers. Each year the country has to import billions of
dollars of fuel. Iran’s refineries can only supply 42
million litres of petrol a day, while the demand is for 70 million litres. This means that Iran imports
over 30 million litres of petrol a day; something that is costing the country
huge amounts of hard currency.
Petrol is heavily subsidised and a
gallon of petrol costs only 35 cents. These subsidies have resulted not only in
smuggling of petrol to the neighbouring countries but also a major financial
drain on the government’s finances. Iran needs to reduce both its
consumption and increase its refining capacity.
To increase refining capacity,
Iran has begun building new
refineries both inside and outside the countries. Iran has planned joint ventures for building
refineries in Syria [[13]],
Venezuela [[14]]
and Indonesia [[15]].
In addition Iran has planned
several refineries inside Iran, with the latest being a
possible joint venture with Essar of India [[16]].
To reduce consumption, the
government has planned a new petrol rationing system. However, rationing by
itself will not address Iranians’ addiction to cheap petrol. The only solution
is the normalisation of the prices, which because of the political situation is
highly unlikely.
Another major drain on the economy
of Iran is its gas consumption.
Iran “has one of the most extensive
residential heating infrastructures in the world, with homes in the most remote
villages warmed toastily with inexpensive natural gas. Total domestic energy
subsidies cost $20 billion to $30 billion a year”[[17]].
Recently, Iran had to stop
delivery of gas to Turkey because of a sudden rise in
local demand. The government, it seems, has not decided yet if it wants the gas
for export, heating homes, creating energy intensive industries or for injecting
into the oil wells. But regardless of the choices it makes, the government knows
that it can not continue indefinitely with the current level of
subsidies.
What now?
The current American financial
attacks on Iran are being
felt in Tehran.
These attacks although a recurring theme, has never been as intense as it is
now. These attacks will cause some pain in Tehran but will not dissuade the government to
abandon its nuclear ambitions. Iran in all likelihood will address
(short term) its production problems and will reduce its local consumption by
increasing the prices (adding to an already high inflation) and rationing. These
attacks do and will hurt Iran, but not to a degree that
United
States desires. These attacks although sever,
can be seen by some in Iran as a blessing in disguise, for it now force the Iranians to address some
unpleasant questions with regard to their economy in general and energy
consumption and subsidies in particular.
Iran suffers from many
economic problems most of which is related to over-involvement of the government
in the economy. Some of the financial problems can be attributed to the
sanctions, but the majority of the existing economic problems are self-made.
Weak management, inefficient use of resources, corruption, red-tapes and myriad
of regulations are just a few among many problems that are facing the Iranian
economy. These problems were not
created by Ahmadinejad, nor can they all be solved by him; however people expect
him to address many of these problems. This is what I call Ahmadinejad’s
Achilles’ heel, which I shall address in my next article. Ahmadinejad was elected mainly for his
promise of putting more bread on the Iranian tables. With the enormous problems
facing him, it is difficult to see how he is going to fulfil his promises to the
electorates.
Meanwhile Bush administration is
bent on regime change in Iran, reducing all chances of a
peaceful resolution to the existing US-Iran problems. One would have expected
that the recent election defeat would have sent a clear signal to the Whitehouse
that the American people want less and not more conflict in the region. But
apparently Bush administration is going in the opposite direction. US is
continuing to increase its naval presence in the Persian
Gulf. The USS John C. Stennis strike group will is soon to join the
USS Dwight Eisenhower aircraft carrier group and USS Boxer strike force in the
Persian Gulf “as a warning to Syria and Iran”. Pushing for more stringent UN
sanctions, use of unilateral sanctions, increasing pressure on foreign
governments to stop dealing with Iran, putting sanctions on Iranian Banks and
increasing the size of US navy presence in Persian Gulf are all signs of hostile
intentions by Bush administration towards Iran.
It is difficult to see how
United States expects
Iran to cooperate on
Iraq and Afghanistan
while being threatened militarily and suffocated economically. It may also all
be a negotiating tactics. First show the guns and then negotiate. But in my
opinion this is neither a bluff nor a negotiating tactic. Bush administration is
behaving like a gambler that has lost everything except his house. Now in one
last desperate attempt it is raising the bet to all or nothing. Let us hope that
the Democrats will stop Bush before he accidentally or by design start another
war in an already volatile region.
About the author: Dr. Abbas Bakhtiar lives in
Norway. He is a management consultant
and a contributing writer for many online journals. He's a former associate
professor of Nordland
University, Norway. [Copyright Abbas Bakhtiar, all rights
reserved.]
[4] Mathew R. Simmons, “Twilight in the Desert: the coming
Saudi oil shock and the world economy”, Wiley, 2005. pp. 299